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The Political Business Cycles in the EU enlarged 1 
Mathilde Maurel2 
 
 
 
1. Politics and business cycles 
The rationale behind the EU enlargement has been extensively debated3. Several authors 
emphasised the lack of convergence between old and new members, and the risk of 
jeopardizing economic growth by limiting the room for political adjustment, others 
considered that the process of enlargement was a way of anchoring the transition towards the 
market, of stabilising the economies, and of accelerating the speed of convergence and 
catching-up. The most popular analytical framework used for assessing the pros and cons of 
the enlargement of the EMU is the OCA (Optimal Currency Area) theory. Basically, the 
theory tells that in the absence of economic symmetry, two countries are less likely to benefit 
from a common currency, and that if they do, the task will be easier with flexible markets. 
More recent studies go further by demonstrating that the process of monetary unification is an 
endogenous process. Once the political decision of entering a common market and sharing the 
same currency has been taken, business cycles become more synchronized - thanks to the 
increase in intra-industry trade amongst others - internal openness increases, capital market 
imperfection vanishes, contributing to ease the financing of backward regions.  
 
Politics matters therefore, through the decision of making a currency union which is rendered 
rational ex post without being it necessarily ex ante. It matters also through political business 
cycles, which are key in the OCA literature, and which can be generated in Philips curves 
models under limited or perfect rationality. A good macro-economic situation is appreciated 
by the voters and helps incumbents to be re-elected. Hence politicians try to create political 
business cycles by tightening economic policy at the beginning of the political mandate and 
by relaxing it just before the elections. If they succeed, then business cycles are political in the 
sense that they are induced by political activism; they can be made more symmetric trough 
electoral synchronisation, through convergence of political preferences, or through adherence 
to the same political agenda like the Stability Pact. All those factors should increase the 
symmetry of shocks that is the desirability of the common currency.  
 
What is the state of arts of the empirical literature? First a strong economic situation favours 
the incumbents and their re-elections; this has been shown for several European countries4. 
Given that, politicians are likely to manipulate economic policy for trying to create (the 
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illusion of) an economic expansion. If the public holds rational expectations, this is doomed to 
fail. If not, or if part of the information is hidden, political business cycles will happen: the 
cost of the deficit is delayed and inflation or devaluation ensue after elections. Empirical 
studies show that the deficit tends to increase during an election in both developed and 
developing countries, but significantly more in the latter5. Furthermore the result is driven by 
new democracies6, while in well established democracies, whatever developing or developed, 
it does not hold.  
 
This has important consequences for economic policy and politicians in transition countries. 
First it implies that voters do not reward fiscal manipulation, and they do so only for the first 
three four years elections up to which the very mechanism of manipulation - its consequences 
on the increase in the level of prices and on the output – is known7. In other words if the 
information is perfect, voters are more likely to be “fiscal conservative”, and only if the 
information is not perfect, a myopic vote can reward opportunistic increases in deficits. 
Improving information by fighting against the lack of transparency, against corruption and 
any institutional mechanism lowering the well-functioning of the democracy will reduce 
therefore the scope for a political business cycle.  
 
2. Transition countries and the EU enlarged 
The evidence for transition and European economies echoes this overall pattern with specific 
features. Andrikopoulos, Loizides and Prodronidis (2004) examine whether EU member 
states manipulated the fiscal policy to create national political business cycles (PBCs), 
opportunistic or partisan, in the 1970–1998 period. Their analysis shows that governments 
have implemented stabilization policies rather. This finding is in contrast with that of Mink 
and De Haan (2006), who argue that fiscal policy-makers in the euro area have pursued 
expansionary policies before elections. “In an election year – but not in the year prior to the 
election – the budget deficit increases”. For Hallerberg and de Souza (2000), the ten Eastern 
European accession countries8 have followed political business cycles during the period of 
their accession, but the pattern is no more pronounced than in the core EU 15 countries.  
 
Those above contradictory findings are likely to be partially at least the product of different 
methodologies and specifications. In order to be able to compare our results with similar 
findings in the literature, we follow the specification of  Brender and Drazen (2005): ( )1.' ,,,, EqdELECxcfbf tiittiktikti εµ ++++= ∑∑ −  
where tif ,  is a fiscal indicator in country i in year t, tix ,  is a vector of control variables, 
tELEC  is an electoral dummy set equal to one for the four quarter before and during the 
election, and iµ  is a country fixed effect. In addition to fixed country effects, our control 
variables are those used by Brender and Drazen (2005)9, that is quarterly GDP per capita, the 
trade share, two demographic variables representing the fraction of the population aged 15–64 
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and 65+, and supply and demand shocks computed in the framework of a VAR, as a measure 
of the output gap10. Our sources are Eurostat, IMF, OECD, and the World Bank.  
 
The empirical analysis includes 28 European countries, EU-25 members (including EMU 
members, EU-15, and some CEECs), plus Romania, Croatia, and Bulgaria, which are not yet 
members of the EU. It is based on a sample of 28 quarterly observations covering 1990 (first 
quarter) –2005 (fourth quarter), which makes a maximum number of 1792 observations. 
There are three fiscal instruments: total expenditure of the general government, total revenue 
of the general government, surplus (deficit), all three in percent of GDP, and one monetary 
instrument, the growth of M3. All variables are quarterly.  
 
In the first column of Table 1, we present fixed-effects regressions for the fiscal balance, 
revenues and expenditures, all as a percentage of GDP, and the rate of growth of M3. We find 
a highly significant political cycle in the fiscal balance, with the deficit rising in an election 
year by about five-tenths of one percent of GDP relative to non-election years. The political 
budget cycle is driven by expenditure, which increases by six-tenths of one percent of GDP 
relative to non-election years, it is not driven by revenue, which remains at the same level 
whatever the period under consideration, electoral or not. Our coefficient of -0.512 (equation 
1) is comparable to -0.49, which is the coefficient found by Shi and Svensson (2002a, b), who 
considered a cross-section of both democracies and non-democracies over the period 1975–
1995. The same equation over the same 20 year period is run by Brender and Drazen (2005), 
who obtain a significant coefficient of -0.632, insignificantly different from -0.49.  
 
We run the same equation but within the sub-sample of transition countries, which are both 
developing countries and new democracies. We want to test the assumption that a voter in a 
developing country11 or in a new democracy12 has a lower ability to process the information 
correctly and therefore to punish incumbents for opportunistic deficits and wasteful spending. 
In the developed old Europe instead, voters are provided by experience with the electoral 
process, they benefit from institutions that collect and provide the relevant data, and from 
media which disseminate and analyze the information. Results do not support this story. 
Although completely new democracies and also developing countries, incumbent 
governments in CEECs do neither manipulate the economy in a more systematic way nor 
more efficiently than their Western counterparts. This of course has to be related to the fact 
that the EU enlargement has been processed under the tacit application of the Maastricht 
criteria, even though those criteria were heavily criticized as being not relevant for transition 
countries, catching-up the EU hub. It can be also related to the very limited room for adjusting 
external shocks given the trade dependence and the fact that monetary policy may create more 
volatility and noise in emerging countries, even in the short run13.  
 
As emphasised in Hallerberg and Vinhas de Souza (2000), in a world of capital mobility and 
fixed exchange rates running larger deficits in election time is more likely than having a loose 
monetary policy. We replace fiscal variables by the rate of growth of M3 (columns 4), and 
find indeed that the latter is not used in order to manipulate the economy. This reflects the fact 
that the number of instruments available to the manipulation is constrained by the monetary 
regime and the construction of the euro zone.  
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We test also the fear that once the currency has been introduced, nothing impedes the 
governments to resort again to economic manipulation. This would translate into higher levels 
of expenditures and deficits during election quarters after December 1999 (columns 3). But 
somehow surprisingly, the idea that free rider behaviours are more likely to occur once the 
monetary union has been achieved is not supported by the results. This of course may be due 
to the time span available, only 5-6 years.  
 
3. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the process of monetary integration across the 25 countries which 
constitute the enlarged EU has been successful in the sense that the budget cycle which was 
active at the beginning of the nineties vanished after the lunch of the euro. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the fiscal manipulation or the increase in deficit in a year of election does not 
appear to be higher within the sub-sample of Ceecs, which are both developing and new 
democracies. 
It has important implications for the perspective of the EMU extension to Eastern European 
countries. If we assume that part of the asymmetry in business cycles is due to opportunistic 
behaviour during election times, more particularly in developing and new democracies where 
the public is more likely to believe that fiscal manipulation can create jobs, then the 
participation to the EMU of those new democracies can embody costs to the monetary union 
as a whole. Our results do not support this view. In the new Eastern European countries, fiscal 
manipulation is not rewarded more than in other European countries and incumbents do not 
engage more in it.  
The question of the participation of accession countries to the EMU remains unsolved. It 
depends upon many other costs and benefits which according to a recent literature have been 
shown to be endogeneous. For instance, the decision of entering a currency union has a 
significant impact on the degree of openness, on the symmetry of shocks, if intra trade 
increases as a result of the adoption of a common currency, on capital mobility, etc. But 
could’nt this decision itself be delayed if politicians were tempted to keep an instrument of re-
election? Such a question is beyond the scope of the paper of course…  
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Table 1 
The political budget cycle across countries, fixed effects estimates, 1990–2005 
  All European Countries  Ceecs  After  the introduction of the Euro  After 1995 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent 
variablea 
 Exp Rev Bal tM3  Exp Rev Bal tM3  Exp Rev Bal tM3  Exp Rev Bal tM3 
ELECTb  0.679** 
(0.307) 
0.193 
(0.202) 
-
0.512* 
(0.295) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
 0.775* 
(0.483) 
0.181 
(0.341) 
-
0.556* 
(0.354) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
 -0.156 
(0.240) 
-0.203 
(0.220) 
-0.163 
(0.268) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.710** 
(0.316) 
0.326 
(0.231) 
-0.373 
(0.300) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
R2 within  0.3165 0.525 0.163 0.138  0.4722 0.6647 0.2243 0.240  0.3701 0.4397 0.1031 0.019  0.2182 0.3742 0.090 0.1804 
F-Stat  67.55 161.74 28.42 23.33  40.70 90.18 13.15 14.06  40.25 53.75 7.88 1.32  30.78 65.93 11.02 24.09 
N° of 
countries 
 26 26  10 10  26 26  26 26 26 26 
N° of 
observations 
 1201 1192  382 374  582 576  916 916 916 910 
Average 
time series 
length 
 46.2 4538   
38.2 
37.4  22.4 22.2  35.2 35.2 35.2 35.0 
 
The covariates include one lag of the dependent variable, the log of per-capita GDP, the ratio of international trade (sum of merchandise exports and imports) to GDP, the 
fraction of the population over age 65, the fraction of the population between ages 15 and 64, and the supply and demand shocks, using the VAR methodology. For a 
presentation of this methodology in the present context, see Babetski, Boone and Maurel (2004). 
* Significant at the 10 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; ***significant at the 1 percent level. 
a Variable definitions (all in percent of GDP): balance—central government surplus; Exp —total expenditure by the central government; Rev—total revenue and grants of the 
central government; tM3- rate of growth of M3. 
b ELECT—a dummy variable with the value 1 in the election year and 0 otherwise. 
 
